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Abstract
This paper develops a growth model aimed at understanding the poten-
tial effects of globalization of production on rate of innovation, distribution 
of skilled labor income between the North and South, and welfare of skilled 
workers in both regions. We adopt a dynamic general equilibrium product-
cycle model, assuming that the North specializes in innovation and the South 
specializes in imitation. Globalization of production resulting from trade lib-
eralization and imitation of the North’s technology by the South increases 
the rate of innovation. In the initial stage of globalization of production, 
deeper globalization unambiguously improves the welfare of skilled labor in 
the North, though welfare of Southern skilled labor may still increase. In the 
later stage, deeper globalization of production unambiguously improves the 
welfare of skilled labor in the South, though welfare of Northern skilled labor 
may still improve. 
JEL codes: F43, O31, O38.
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ne of the most remarkable developments in international trade in the 
past thirty years has been the globalization of production of differ-
entiated manufactured goods. Differentiated manufactured goods can be 
broadly defined as goods that emerged as a result of such inventions as 
electricity or computer-related technology. Examples are color TV, refrig-
erators, and microcomputers. These are technologically distinct from tra-
ditional goods that emerged before the twentieth century, such as textile, 
glass, and iron and steel. Differentiated goods were almost all originally 
developed by the advanced industrialized countries (North). Until about 
three decades ago, they were still mostly produced by the North. How-
ever, trade liberalization, policy changes in the less-developed countries 
(South), and technological advancement in telecommunications led to the 
transfer of production of some of these differentiated goods to the South 
because labor costs are much lower there. We call this transfer of produc-
tion of differentiated goods from the North to the South globalization of 
production.
Table 1 illustrates the globalization of production. It shows that China’s 
output of major industrial products increased dramatically from 1978 (begin-
ning of reform by Deng Xiaoping) to 2005. Note, however, that the magni-
tudes of increase are much higher for differentiated goods, such as room air 
conditioners, refrigerators, color TVs, microcomputers, mobile phones, and 
integrated circuits. This, we argue, reflects the globalization of production of 
differentiated goods. We are interested in the impacts of such globalization 
of production on global growth and living standards in the North and the 
South.
International technology diffusion and trading of differentiated manu-
factured goods between the North and the South is well captured by Ray-
mond Vernon’s (1966) “product cycle” theory. According to Vernon, new 
products are usually developed in the most-advanced countries (such as the 
U.S. in the 1960s). During the initial period, production is located where the 
product is developed, to allow efficient feedback between R&D and produc-
tion. When the production design, production process, and inputs become 
sufficiently standardized, the technology will be transferred to lower-wage 
countries. If we apply this theory to the technologically more-advanced 
economies such as the U.S. and the less-developed economies such as China 
and India, we can better understand how the increased participation of these 
countries in the globalization of production affects growth, labor income dis-
tribution between the North and the South, and living standard of workers 
in these regions.
Therefore, in this paper, we adopt the product-cycle framework, as-
suming that technology is transferred from the North to the South through 
costly imitation by Southern firms. That technology is transferred by imi-
tation can be justified by the fact that Southern firms would eventually 
learn the technology brought by multinational corporations (MNCs) from 
the North. Once they have imitated the technology, Southern firms have the 
advantage that they are more familiar with the Southern environment and 
therefore can price out the Northern MNCs that brought in the technology 














































Table 1: China’s Output of Major Industrial Products 
Actual production 2005 output/
1978 output 1978 2005 Unit
Chemical fiber 284,600 16.6 mn tons 58.3
Yarn 2.4 mn 14.5 mn  tons 6.0
Cloth 11.0 bn 48.4 bn  meters 4.4
Silk 29,700  111,000  tons 3.7
Paper 4.4 mn  62.1 mn  tons 14.1
Plastics 679,000  23.1 mn  tons 34.0
Sugar 2.3 mn  9.1 mn  tons 4.0
Beer 400,000  31.3 mn  tons 78.3
Cigarettes 11.8 mn  193.9 mn  cases 16.4
Refrigerators 28,000  29.9 mn  units 1,068
Room ACs 200  67.6 mn  units 338,000
Washing machines 400  30.4 mn  units 76,000
Color TVs 3,800  82.8 mn  units 21,789
Motor vehicles 149,100  5.7 mn  units 38.2
Electricity 257.6 mn  2,500.3 mn  1000 kwh 9.7
Crude oil 104.1 mn  181.4 mn   tons 1.7
Coal 618.0 mn  2,205.0 mn   tons 3.6
Natural gas 13.7 mn  50.9 mn  1000 cubic meters 3.7
Hydropower 44.6 mn  397.0 mn  1000 kwh 8.9
Pig iron 34.8 mn  343.8 mn   tons 9.9
Steel 31.8 mn  353.2 mn   tons 11.1
Steel products 22.1 mn  377.7 mn   tons 17.1
Cement 65.2 mn  1,068.8 mn     tons 16.4
Plate glass  17.8 mn  402.1 mn   wt. cases 22.6
Sulfuric acid 6.6 mn  45.4 mn   tons 6.9
Chemical fertilizer 8.7 mn  51.8 mn   tons 6.0
Microcomputers 0 80.8 mn  units N/A
Integrated circuits 30.4 mn  26,997.3 mn   units 888
Mobile phones 0 303.5 mn  units N/A
NOTE: mn = million; bn = billion.
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007 China Statistical Yearbook, China 
Statistics Press, Table 14-22.
Krugman (1979) was among the first to construct a dynamic general 
equilibrium model of the North–South product cycle to study the effects of 
policies on world income distribution and the technological gap between the 
North and the South. Assuming that innovation takes the form of expansion 
of product variety and that rate of product innovation and rate of imitation 
are exogenous, he shows that an increase in the rate of innovation (imitation) 
raises the relative wage of the North (South). He also shows that a country’s 














































ply. Dollar (1986) introduces capital and capital mobility in a Krugman-type 
model and arrives at similar conclusions.
Modifying Krugman’s model, Grossman and Helpman (1991a) endog-
enize the rate of product innovation and rate of imitation in an expanding-
variety-type growth model. They assume Northern firms engage in costly 
product innovation and Southern firms engage in costly imitation of North-
developed products. In contrast to Krugman, they find, among other things, 
that an increase in the supply of skilled labor (that is essential for both 
production and research) in a country raises the relative wage (which is 
also the terms of trade) of that country. In their model, two opposing forces 
are at work as the supply of a factor increases: The quantity of the factor 
allocated to production increases, and the demand of the factor for produc-
tion also increases because the fraction of goods produced by the country 
increases. They find that the latter effect always dominates the former in 
their model.1 
We are interested in understanding the effects of the South’s increased 
participation in global production, which we interpret as increases in the al-
location of Southern skilled labor (technicians and engineers, who can be al-
located to either production or imitation) to product-cycle goods. To be sure, 
the allocation of Southern skilled labor to product-cycle goods is not exog-
enous. We want to focus on two main factors that determine this allocation: 
trade liberalization between the North and South and costs of telecommuni-
cations in the South. We [will] justify how these two changes affect Southern 
allocation of labor in the product cycle. We then argue that we can use an 
autonomous increase in the South’s allocation of labor to product-cycle goods 
to proxy for a decrease in the cost of telecommunications in the South.
The manufacturing sector of each country consists of traditional goods 
and differentiated goods. We assume that all differentiated goods are de-
veloped by the North. Before trade liberalization between the North and 
South, we assume that trade barriers were prohibitive. Having no trade 
with the North, the South did not know how to imitate the differentiated 
goods. Therefore, no Southern skilled labor was involved in production of 
differentiated goods. With no trade between the two regions, Northern firms 
produced agricultural goods, traditional goods, and differentiated goods and 
sold to the North only, while Southern firms produced agricultural goods and 
traditional goods and sold to the South only. However, for simplicity, we do 
not model the agricultural and traditional goods sectors in this paper.
Immediately after trade liberalization, the North exports differentiated 
goods to the South, while the South exports agricultural and traditional 
goods to the North. After the North exports differentiated goods to the 
1 In another paper, Grossman and Helpman (1991b) model a more complex pattern of 
innovation and imitation. The “inefficient follower” case in their model yields similar results 
as in Grossman and Helpman (1991a). The “efficient follower” case generates numerous 
ambiguous results, including the effect of labor supply on the relative wage of a country. In 
Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos’ (1990) product-cycle-model, innovation takes the form 
of quality improvement in the North. Technology is transferred to the South through costless 
imitation, and the length of the product cycle (imitation lag) is exogenous. Since there is no 
R&D sector in the South, an increase in Southern labor supply lowers the relative wage of 














































South, the latter learn to imitate them eventually. In steady-state equilib-
rium, Southern firms imitate some but not all of the differentiated goods, 
produce them, and export them to the North. In steady-state equilibrium, 
there is trade in agricultural and traditional goods, but we do not model 
them in this paper for simplicity.
Even after trade liberalization, the quantity of Southern skilled labor 
that participates in the product cycle is constrained by the cost of telecom-
munications (Internet, electronic mail, cellphone, long-distance phone, fax, 
etc.) in the South. We assume that there is limited labor mobility between 
cities and between rural and urban centers in the South. Initially, only labor 
hired by firms in large (or coastal) Southern cities can profitably partici-
pate in the product cycle, as the cost of telecommunications is lower there. 
Eventually, as telecommunication costs decrease, labor hired by firms in 
smaller (or inland) cities can profitably participate in the product cycle. The 
allocation of skilled labor in the North to product-cycle goods, however, is 
constant, as the North is a mature economy where telecommunications are 
already well developed.
We are interested in understanding the effects of (i) trade liberalization, 
which is equivalent to a transition from autarky equilibrium to free trade 
equilibrium for a given cost of communications (i.e., for a given allocation of 
labor from large Southern cities), and (ii) a decrease in communication costs 
after trade liberalization (which leads to an increase in allocation of labor 
due to the participation of smaller Southern cities). We call the first transi-
tion the initial stage of globalization of production and the second transition 
the deepening of globalization of production.
Based on the above argument, we use the increase in the allocation of 
skilled labor in the South to proxy for the decrease in the communication 
costs in the South during the deepening of globalization. We compare the 
autarky equilibrium with the free trade equilibrium, keeping the allocation 
of Southern labor constant. More important, based on free trade, we carry 
out comparative steady-state analyses of the effects of changes in the South’s 
allocation of labor to product-cycle goods on the rate of innovation, rate of 
imitation, income distribution between skilled workers in the two regions, 
and welfare of skilled labor in the two regions. To this end, we develop a 
model of the endogenous product cycle inspired by Grossman and Helpman 
(1991a). One essential innovation in this paper is that the time it takes to 
imitate is assumed to depend negatively on the quantity of resources devoted 
to imitation. This assumption is justified because the longer it takes, the 
fewer resources are required to reverse-engineer a technology and to adapt 
it to a new environment. See, for example, Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner 
(1981); Mansfield et al. (1982); and Teece (1976, 1977).2 We believe such a 
trade-off is especially important in industries where product innovation and 
2 Although Teece (1976) says that some firms found that, ex post, the cost of imitation 
actually increases with the time it takes to imitate (presumably when there are uncertainties 
in the time–cost relationship), Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) provide evidence of 
a significantly negative relationship between imitation cost and time to imitate. We think 
the latter result makes sense when uncertainties are small. In our model, there are no 














































imitation occur at a very high pace, such as the computer industry. We are 
able to endogenize the steady-state imitation lag and the cost of imitation 
for each product. It will be seen that the incorporation of such an essential 
characteristic of the imitation cost function, which has largely been ignored 
by the literature on product-cycle theory, would have crucial impacts on 
comparative steady-state results.
The following is a summary of our findings. First, globalization of pro-
duction resulting from trade liberalization and imitation of Northern tech-
nology by the South would increase growth of the North. Second, with free 
trade, when the South learns to imitate faster, it leads to a higher rate of 
innovation, higher rate of imitation and higher wage of Southern skilled labor 
relative to that of the North, given that the skilled labor is essential for both 
production and research in each country. Third, the larger the Southern al-
location of skilled labor in the product cycle, the higher the cost of imitation 
is. This has interesting implications: With free trade, when the Southern al-
location of labor is sufficiently small, an increase in Southern labor allocation 
will lower the wage of the South relative to that of the North. In other words, 
in the initial stage of the South’s participation in the international product 
cycle (when its allocation of labor is small), an increase in the allocation of 
labor lowers the relative wage. Eventually, however, as the labor allocation in 
the South becomes sufficiently large, its relative wage increases as allocation 
increases. The key factor in determining the direction of the effect is whether 
the (endogenous) increase in quantity of labor allocated to production domi-
nates the (endogenous) increase in demand for labor in production. When 
allocation of labor is small, the former effect dominates the latter. When 
allocation of labor is sufficiently large, the reverse is true.
There are two major implications of our results. First, Northern skilled 
workers unambiguously gain from deeper globalization of production dur-
ing its initial stage (when the South’s participation in the product cycle is 
relatively small) as growth becomes faster and its relative wage becomes 
higher as globalization deepens. For the South, even though its relative wage 
decreases with deeper globalization during its initial stage, Southern skilled 
labor can still gain from deeper globalization, as the growth rate becomes 
faster and a larger fraction of differentiated goods are produced by the low-
cost South. Second, in the later stage of integration (when Southern al-
location of labor reaches a sufficiently high level so that a sufficiently large 
fraction of goods are produced by the South through imitation), the welfare 
calculus of skilled labor in each region is just the opposite of the initial stage, 
as deepening globalization leads to an increase in the Southern wage relative 
to that of the North. Thus, the South unambiguously gains and the North 
may or may not gain.
In Section 1, we lay down the main body of the imitation model. In 
Section 2, we solve the steady-state equilibrium, and in Section 3 some com-
parative steady-state analyses are carried out. Section 4 concludes with a 
discussion on the caveats of the model.
1. THE IMITATION MODEL
We tell the story backwards. In this section and the next, we assume 














































place and there is free trade in the world. We ask how the world equilibrium 
is affected as globalization deepens. In Section 3, we compute the autarky 
equilibrium in the North and compare the autarky and free equilibria.
So, in Sections 1 and 2, we consider a two-country world economy in 
which, in equilibrium, the North is the sole source of innovation and the oth-
er country, the South, only imitates goods from the North. In each country, 
there is a single factor input, which can be used to undertake three possible 
types of activities: innovation (product development), imitation (reverse-en-
gineering of developed products), and production of goods. For convenience 
of exposition, we call this factor input human capital, or skilled labor, or sim-
ply labor. Innovation takes the form of development of a new variety of the 
differentiated good. Potentially, there is an infinite number of goods that can 
be developed, but at any given time, only a finite number of goods has been 
developed. Production technology is constant returns to scale, and labor is 
the only factor of production. We assume that the unit labor requirement for 
production for an imitator firm is the same as for the innovator firm once 
the technology is imitated.
In explaining the model, we again tell the story backwards. We first as-
sume that goods are continuously being developed and consumers have per-
fect foresight of the number of goods available at each date and are offered 
the price of each variety. Consumer utility maximization determines the 
demand function of each variety. Then we explain how prices of goods are 
chosen by profit-maximizing producers given the producers’ perfect foresight 
of consumers’ demands. Next, we introduce the cost functions of innovation 
and imitation. Potential innovators and imitators decide whether to enter the 
market. Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, all innovators and imitators 
earn zero economic profit. Thus, the equilibrium balanced growth rate is 
determined.
The Demand for Goods
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991a), we assume that a world rep-
resentative agent (or, alternatively, one representative agent in each country) 
chooses the time path of instantaneous expenditure E(t) and instantaneous 
consumption x(z) of good z ∈[0,n(t)] at each date to maximize the intertem-
poral welfare function3
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subject to (i) the intertemporal budget constraint4 
3 Use of the more general function We d t
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1 , where equation 1 is a 
special case as σ→1, leads to the same qualitative conclusion.
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where 0<α <1, n(t) denotes the most recently developed good in the world 
at time t, r = time rate of preference, r = interest rate, U(τ) = instantaneous 
utility at time τ, I(τ) = instantaneous income at τ, A(t) = value of assets 
at t. In each period τ, the agent takes A(τ), I(τ), r, and prices of goods as 
given.
The dynamic optimization problem specified by equations 1, 2, and 3 
can be broken down into an intratemporal optimization problem at time t of 
choosing x(z) (for given n(t)) to maximize U(t) subject to the instantaneous 
budget constraint, and the intertemporal optimization problem of choosing 
a time path of E(t) to maximize W subject to the demand function of x(z) 
(determined by intratemporal optimization on the demand side) and the 
prices of goods p(z) (determined by intratemporal optimization on the sup-
ply side).








0 ∫ = s.t. .
The intertemporal optimization problem will be solved after we have 
solved the instantaneous problems on the demand side and the supply side. 
Hereinafter, we drop the time argument t for convenience, unless otherwise 
stated.
From the first order condition of the maximization problem (4), and 
















where ε=1/(1–α)>1 and 0≤α ≤1. The parameter ε=1/(1–α) is the elas-
ticity of substitution between any two goods. The greater α is, the greater is 
ε, and the less is the love of variety.
The Supply of Goods
We assume constant returns to scale in production of each good. The 
only fixed costs are the costs of innovation and imitation.
We assume that each good is produced by a different firm and that firms 
compete with each other by setting prices. The market structure is one of 
monopolistic competition, and each firm has certain market power over the 
submarket of its good. During the production stage, due to the time separa-
5 Alternatively, U(τ) can be regarded as quantity of final goods produced from a set of 














































bility of the intertemporal profits function, each firm chooses its price, given 
the prices of other goods, to maximize instantaneous profit π(z), subject to 
the demand function (5). Therefore, a producer solves 
(6)
()
() () {()( )}
pz
zx zp zc z π =− max
s.t. the demand function (5), where c(z) is the unit production cost of good z.
Ignoring the effects of any single producer on the denominator of de-








given the assumption that the unit labor requirement for production is equal 
to 1 for all good z, i.e., c(z)=w, where w= wage rate.
Using the results of the intratemporal optimization problem, the first 






The above equation states that the growth rate of E will be higher 
when consumers are less impatient (more willing to invest in the future), 
for any given r . We define n ⋅/n≡g in the steady state and normalize by 
setting the price of a firm (or the value of a blueprint) equal to a constant 
in all periods, i.e., E
⋅
/E ≡n ⋅/n. We can then rewrite the above equation as   
(8)  r=r+g.
A Two-Country World
To analyze the two-country world, we introduce the following nota-
tion. Among the n goods existing in the world at time t, goods 0 to nS are 
produced by the South (after they have been imitated from the North), and 
the rest are produced by the North. Because of symmetry of all goods in 
the demand function, xN  stands for the demand for any good produced by a 
Northern firm, while xS stands for the demand for any good produced by a 
Southern imitator. The variables xN and xS are determined by the demand 
function (as shown in equation 5) when the prices of the n goods are known. 
Because transportation cost is zero and there are no trade barriers, the 
producer of a good always sells to the world market. Let πN be the instanta-
neous profit of a Northern firm and πS be that of a Southern imitator firm. 
Wage rates in North and South are denoted by wN and wS , respectively. The 
number of Southern workers who can profitably participate in the product 
cycle is constrained by the cost of telecommunication in the South, which 
is nontrivial. When the telecommunication cost is lower, a larger fraction of 
Southern workers find it profitable to sell to the North. Therefore, the al-
location of Southern labor that participates in global production increases 














































of Northern skilled labor in product-cycle goods, however, is unaffected, as 
the North is a mature economy where telecommunication is already well 
developed. For given telecommunication costs in the South, the labor alloca-
tions in the South and North are constants, which we denote by LS and LN, 
respectively.
On the “balanced growth path” that we analyze, the steady state is 





/E, so that wN, wS, 
E, n, and nS are in constant ratio with each other over time. It can be de-
duced from equations 5 through 7 and symmetry of all x(z) in the utility 
function that in the steady state, πN and πS are constant over time. Note that 
the growth rate of utility is proportional to g.6
We assume that only the Northern firms innovate and only the Southern 
firms imitate in steady-state equilibrium. In equilibrium, a Northern firm 
develops a good by incurring an upfront cost and then earns the opportunity 
to make a constant stream of profits at each date in the future until the good 
is imitated. Later in the product’s life, a Southern firm would find it profit-
able to invest to imitate or reverse-engineer the product. Once a product is 
imitated by the South, its production location will be shifted there forever. 
Before its good is imitated, a Northern innovator-producer firm prices 




N = α .
However, there are two pricing rules of a Southern firm after it imitates 
a good, according to whether, in equilibrium, the gap between wN and wS is 
large or small, as shown below.
(a) Wide-gap case
If wS/α<wN, i.e., wS<αwN , the unconstrained, monopoly, profit-max-
imizing price level of a Southern imitator firm is less than the cost of the 
Northern innovator, and therefore, under the assumption of price competi-
tion, the Nash equilibrium would be one at which the Southern firm will set 







If wS/α>wN, i.e., wS>αwN , price competition between the Northern 
innovator and the Southern imitator would drive the Nash equilibrium price 
level to slightly below the cost of the high-cost firm, viz., pS =wN .
Only the wide-gap case will be discussed in this paper, since all results 
are qualitatively the same in the narrow-gap case, as evident in the work of, 
say, Grossman and Helpman (1991a).
6 Differentiating equation 3 along the steady-state path, using n ⋅/n =p ⋅/p =E
⋅
/E =g and 


















































According to equations 5, 6, 9, and 10, instantaneous profit of a South-
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πS=πΝ .
Imitation Activity in the South
We assume, as in Romer (1990), that the knowledge stock in the South 
lowers the cost of imitation. We also assume that the relevant knowledge 
stock for imitating good z is the knowledge stock in the South at the time the 
product z is developed td . To imitate a product, an imitator hires workers to 
work at date td and expects the imitation to be completed at date t . We as-
sume there is a negative relationship between the labor devoted to imitation 
and t-td . Specifically, the cost of imitation of good z by a Southern firm 











−− λ , λρ >+ g assuming that
where  b is a parameter; t-td is the time it takes to imitate good z; λ 
is  the  exogenous  rate  of  decline  of  the  labor  requirement  for  imita-
tion with respect to the time it takes to imitate; KS (td) is the knowledge 
stock at date td, which the imitator treats as given. To obtain a steady 
state consistent with constant allocation of resources in both regimes, we 
use nS (t) to proxy for the knowledge stock in the South at time t, i.e.,   
KS (t)=nS (t), ∀t. 
The  above  imitation  cost  function  indicates  that  the  unit  labor  re-
quirement  for  imitation  is  composed  of  the  product  of  two  parts:   
(i) 1/nS (td), which is inversely related to the cumulative experience of imi-
tation in the South at the time when the product was developed, and (ii)   
be–λ(t-t
d), which decreases exponentially with the time it takes to imitate. 
The first term captures the knowledge spillovers from previous imitational 
R&D (See, for example, Grossman and Helpman 1991a and Romer 1990). 
Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) give some evidence about the nega-
tive relationship between cost of imitation and the time to imitate, which is 
consistent with the second term above.
According to equation 12, since wS (td)/nS (td) is predetermined at td and 
it is a constant, imitation cost decreases with the time it takes to imitate at 
an exponential rate of λ>0, while equation 11 implies that the present dis-
counted value (PDV) of profits derived from an imitated product decreases 














































time at which it becomes profitable for a Southern firm to imitate from a 
Northern firm, as shown in Figure 1. As will be elaborated later, free entry 
ensures that profits are equal to zero.7
Figure 1: Determination of Date of Imitation of a Good
1    
td tS




NOTE: Ci (z,t) is the cost of completing the imitation of good z at date t when the good is 
developed at date td . In equilibrium, the good is imitated at date tS , when the profit of the 
imitator is driven to zero due to free entry into the imitation business.
Innovation Activity of the North
We assume that innovation is completed immediately after resources are 
devoted to it. This is an innocuous assumption since our analysis focuses on 
changes in Southern allocation of labor and imitation capability. The cost of 











where a is a parameter, K(td) is the knowledge stock at date td when innova-
tion takes place, and 1/K(td) captures the knowledge spillovers from previ-
ous product development in the North in the spirit discussed in the previous 
subsection. To obtain a steady state, we again proxy the knowledge stock in 
the North at date t by n(t), i.e., K(t)=n(t), ∀t.
7 There is time–cost tradeoff only when λ>r , since only then will the decline in labor 
requirement be faster than the decline in PDV of profits from imitation. Therefore, the 
condition is a necessary condition for the existence of a steady-state equilibrium. We also 
need to assume that bwS /wN>π/r, which is equivalent to b >(1–α)(LS –bgξλ/g)/[α(p+g)] 















































Profits to Northern Innovators and Southern Imitators
Let VN be the PDV of future profits that can be earned by a Northern 
innovator (for a product developed at time t) when no imitation will ever 
take place. Recall that πN is the instantaneous profit of a Northern firm at 










Let VS be the PDV of profits of a Southern imitator (for a product imi-
tated at time t) and recall that πS is the instantaneous profit of a Southern 










Let tS be the equilibrium imitation date of a good that is developed at 
date td. It follows that the index of this good is exactly nS at time tS . It can 
be easily shown that in steady state, when n ⋅/n=n ⋅
S /nS =g, 
(14) ξ ≡= =
−− − n
n ee S gt t gT Sd () ,
where T ≡tS-td is the equilibrium length of the product cycles. There are 
several interpretations of the variable ξ in steady state: first, ξ represents 
the equilibrium fraction of products produced in the South in steady state; 
second, ξ can also be regarded as the (inverse) technological gap between the 
South and the North; third, to compute the PDV at date td of a sum at tS, 
a factor of e–r(t
S-t
d)=ξr/g is used.8
It follows from equations 12 and 14 that the reduced form of the cost of 







= ξλ/g at any date.
The component ξλ/g is the part of the imitation cost that accounts for 
the time–cost trade-off in imitation.
Zero-Profit Conditions for Firms
Free entry implies that no firms can make any positive net profit, prop-
erly discounted. This implies that, for the Southern firm, the PDV of profits 
equals the cost of imitation in equilibrium: 
8 By definition, nS=n0eg(td-t0) and n=n0eg(tS-t0), where n0 is the value of n at time t0. 
This implies that ξ=nS/n =e–g(tS-td), which is equation 14. Moreover, ξr/g=(nS/n)r/g=e–r(tS-td). 
Therefore, ξr/g is the discount factor used to compare profits at the time of imitation with 





















































Moreover, free entry without barriers ensures that the PDV of profits of 
the Northern innovator is equal to the cost of innovation. The profit of the 
Northern firm, however, does not last forever. It ends when the product is 
imitated. The PDV of this loss is equal to V Ne–r(tS-td)=V N  ξr/g. Therefore, the 





n (1–ξr/g)=V N(1–ξr/g)=a .
Labor Market Clearing Conditions
For a given cost of telecommunications, the number of Southern workers 
who find it profitable to participate in global production, LS, is predeter-
mined. Labor in each country is allocated endogenously between production 
and either product development (in the North) or imitation (in the South).
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N/n(1–ξ) is the instantaneous production labor input for a good 
produced in the North. In other words, the instantaneous profit of a good 
produced in the North is simply a markup factor (1–α)/α times the instan-
taneous wage bill of production workers for that good.
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where L
p
S/nS is the instantaneous production labor input for a South-pro-
duced good.
Now, define Ld = labor devoted to product development in the North. 
Therefore, Ld + L
p




N = LN –ag.
Similarly, according to equation 15, labor devoted to imitation in the 
South  is  Li=Ci(n ⋅
S/wS)=b(n ⋅
S/nS)ξλ/g=bgξλ/g.  Since  Li +L
p






The model is now fully characterized by the following equations: Equa-
tion 8 is the interest rate–growth rate relationship; equations 16 and 17 are 
the zero-profit conditions for the firms; equations 18 and 19 represent instan-
taneous profits of these firms as fixed markups of instantaneous production 
costs; equations 20 and 21 are labor market clearing conditions in the North 
and South, respectively.
Rate of Innovation and Technological Gap
To solve the system of simultaneous equations, we reduce it to a system 
of two equations and two unknowns involving g and ξ . Using equation 20, 
we can substitute for L
p
N in equation 18. Using the resulting expression, we 
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,
and, as mentioned before, L
p
N/n(1–ξ) is the instantaneous production labor 
input of a Northern-produced good. The above equation is a zero-profit 
condition for a Northern innovator. The left-hand side (LHS) is the PDV of 
the stream of the instantaneous profits of a product developed in the North, 
taking into account the fact that the stream of profits will terminate upon 
imitation by multiplying by 1– ξr/g. Interest rate r is the discount factor. The 
term (1–α)L
p
N  wN/[αn(1–ξ)] is the instantaneous profit expressed as a fixed 
markup of instantaneous production cost. The right-hand side (RHS) is the 
innovation cost. Note that wN/n can be canceled from both sides of the equa-














































equilibrium relationship between g and ξ in the North. Invoking equation 
8, we obtain the reduced-form “no-arbitrage condition” in the North (see 
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where hN ≡LN/a is the effective allocation of labor for innovation in the 
North.
Define f(ξ,g)≡(1–ξr/g)/(1–ξ)=(1–ξr/g+1)/(1 – ξ). Since r =r+g>g, in 
the steady state, it can be shown that df/dξ >0 and df/dg<0 (See Appendix 
A). By the implicit function theorem, it is clear that equation 22 represents 
an upward sloping curve NN in the (g,ξ) space, as shown in Figure 2. 
Therefore, the Northern no-arbitrage condition shows a positive relation 
between g and ξ .
Figure 2: Equilibrium Values of g and ξ
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NOTE: An increase in LS  shifts the SS curve up and increases g, but the magnitude of g is 
bounded from above by (1–α)hN .
It  might  seem  counterintuitive  that  the  rate  of  innovation  increases   
despite an increase in the rate of imitation. This is true because there are 
two opposing forces in action: (a) for a given n, a greater ξ leads to fewer 
firms in the North, increasing the profit rate of each Northern firm; and (b) 
a greater ξ means greater rate of capital loss to the innovator due to imita-
tion. It is clear from equation 22 that as long as the rate at which values of 
products are discounted (r) is greater than the rate at which products are 
created (g), an increase in ξ raises the proportion of Southern firms (ξ) by 
a greater fraction than it raises the discount factor at the time of imitation 
(ξr/g), so that effect (a) dominates effect (b), resulting in a net increase in the 
instantaneous profit of the marginal Northern firm, thereby inducing more 
entry. It turns out that the restriction “discount dominates growth” (r>g) 














































Using equation 21, we can substitute for L
p
S in equation 19. Using the 
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ξλ/g ,
where, as mentioned before, L
p
S/nS is the instantaneous production labor 
input of a Southern-produced good. The above equation is a zero-profit con-
dition for a Southern imitator. The LHS is the PDV of a stream of instan-
taneous profits of a product imitated by a Southern firm, which is a fixed 
markup of instantaneous production cost (1–α)L
p
SwS/(αnS). The RHS is 
the imitation cost. Note also that wS/nS can be canceled from both sides 
of the equation, meaning that changes in wS  and nS have no effect on the 
reduced-form equilibrium relationship between g and ξ in the South. Invok-
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(hS−gξλ/g)=(ρ+g)ξλ/g,
where hS≡LS/b is the effective allocation of labor for imitation from the 
South. It follows that equation 23 represents a downward sloping curve in 
the (g,ξ) space. It is shown as curve SS in Figure 2. Intuitively, a higher rate 
of innovation implies that more labor is allocated to imitation and less labor 
allocated to each good, but each imitation needs more labor input. Smaller 
scale of production of each imitated good, which translates into lower profit 
for each imitated product, combined with higher labor requirement for each 
act of imitation means that gross profit from each imitation cannot cover the 
cost of imitation. Therefore, ξ , the fraction of goods produced by the South, 
must decrease so as to increase the scale of production of each imitated va-
riety and to reduce the cost of imitation. This would restore the zero-profit 
condition. Thus, in the steady state, the dynamic equilibrium in the South 
requires that an increase in the rate of innovation must be accompanied by 
a decrease in the fraction of goods produced by the South.
Relative Wage 
From equation 11, we obtain πS /πN =(wS/wN)1–ε. From equations 18





N)[(1–ξ)/ξ].  Therefore,  equating  the  RHS  of  the
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.
The expression is quite intuitive: Given that the labor allocated to in-
novation in the North and labor allocated to imitation in the South re-
main constant, and the fraction of goods produced in the North remains 
unchanged, an increase in LS or decrease in LN leads to a decrease in the 














































3. COMPARATIVE STEADY-STATE ANALYSIS
We study two changes: (i) the transition from autarky to globalization 
for a given (relatively small) allocation of labor from the South; and (ii) the 
deepening of globalization caused by a decrease in the cost of communication, 
which triggers an increase in the allocation of labor LS from the South.
From Autarky to Globalization
We focus our discussion on the effects on the North. We define autarky 
in the North as self-sufficiency in agricultural, traditional and differentiated 
goods. What does the steady state look like under autarky in the North? 
Note that equations 1 through 9, 13, and 20 continue to hold, while equations 
17, 18, and 20 hold by setting ξ=0, as there is no imitation. It is, therefore, 
clear that the steady-state growth rate is obtained from equation 22 by set-
ting ξ=0.  With trade liberalization and imitation of some differentiated 
goods by the South, ξ increases. The steady-state value of ξ is dependent on 
LS, which is in turn determined by the number of Southern workers who are 
employed by firms that can communicate effectively with the North so as 
to profitably conduct trade with them. Thus, LS is determined by the cost 
of telecommunications, such as the costs of access to the Internet, mobile 
phones, international phone calls, and fax services.9
How does globalization affect the rate of growth of the world? From 
equation 22, we can see that g increases as ξ increases from zero. Thus, 
the North grows faster with globalization of production made possible by 
trade liberalization in differentiated goods and technology acquisition by the 
South through imitation. What are the effects of globalization on the living 
standard of Northern workers? We see that not only is there more variety of 
differentiated goods available for consumption in the North, but the price of 
each good relative to the Northern wage is either unchanged (if it continues 
to be produced in the North) or lower (if its production is now transferred to 
the South). Therefore, the living standard of each Northern worker increases 
from autarky to the initial stage of globalization.
In the initial stage of globalization, only large cities in the South engage 
in imitation and trade of differentiated goods with the North as the cost of 
access to telecommunication is lower compared with small Southern cities. 
As the cost of telecommunication decreases, firms in smaller Southern cities 
find it profitable to engage in the product cycle. This leads to an increase in 
LS  and thus a deepening of globalization. In the next subsection, we analyze 
the effects of such a change in depth.
9 In some countries, such as China, LS can be increased by a relaxation of rural–urban 
migration policy, which in the past controlled the number of people who could migrate from 














































Deepening of Globalization: an Increase in LS
The effects of changes in LS , b, and λ on g, ξ, ξλ/g, and wS /wN are sum-
marized in Table 2.10 Note that ξλ/g is a measure of the part of the imitation 
cost that accounts for the time–cost trade-off. From the table, it is shown 
that an increase in LS leads to an increase in g, ξ, and ξλ/g; an increase in λ 
increases both g and ξ but lowers ξλ/g. An increase of LS increases the cost of 
imitation in equilibrium since each good is imitated earlier in the new steady 
state. An increase in λ, on the other hand, lowers the cost of imitation in 
equilibrium, since the cost of imitation falls faster with time to imitate. It 
will be shown below that the effect of LS on the cost of imitation has a cru-
cial impact on the Southern wage relative to that of the North.
Table 2: Comparative Steady-State Results
g ξ ξλ/g wS /wN
LS ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ or ↓
b ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
λ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑
NOTES: ↑ indicates an increase, ↓ indicates a decrease, LS is South’s allocation of labor to 
product-cycle goods, b is imitation labor requirement parameter, λ is time vs. imitation-cost 
trade  -off rate, g is growth rate, ξ is North–South technology gap, ξλ/g is time-dependent 
component of imitation cost.
In this subsection, we only explain in detail the results concerning wS /
wN , as it is the most interesting. In the next section, we discuss the effects 
of an increase in the learning capability λ of the South.
There are three effects of an increase in LS on wS /wN :
(I)  Direct  effect:  An  increase  in  total  allocation  of  labor  LS  lowers     
wS /wN in the same way as in Krugman (1979).
(II) Indirect effect from g: An increase in g lowers the allocation of labor 
to production in both the North and the South. This effect is ambiguous, 
but when ξλ/g is sufficiently small, it is negative (i.e., an increase in g lowers 
wS /wN ).11
(III) Indirect effect from ξ: An increase in ξ increases the fraction of 
goods produced in the South but lowers the fraction of goods produced by 
the North, thereby increasing the demand for production labor in the South 
and reducing the demand for production labor in the North, pushing up wS /
wN . The effect becomes larger as ξ increases.
10 An increase in λ shifts SS to the right and raises g and ξ. From equation 23, since 
g increases, ξλ/g must be lower; as ξ is larger, λ/g must be larger to make ξλ/g smaller. An 
increase in LS shifts SS up, resulting in higher g and ξ. From equation 23, it is clear that   
ξλ/g must increase too. 















































Figure 3: Effects of Increase in Southern Labor Allocation When LS   
Is Small
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NOTE: These are the effects of an increase in LS  when hS<hN θ.
The three effects are clearly depicted in Figure 3. The solid RAp curve 
shows the labor allocated to production in the South relative to that in the 
















where Li=bgξλ/g and Ld=ag. The solid RDp curve shows the demand for 
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,
which follows directly from equation 24.
Effect I shifts RAp to the right as LS increases. Effect II shifts RAp to 
the right if an increase in g raises (LS –Li)/(LN–Ld), which will be true when 
ξλ/g is sufficiently small. Effect III shifts RDp to the right (and its effect in-
creases with ξ ).12 First of all, we find the sufficient condition for an increase 
in LS to lower wS /wN. We make use of the NN curve (equation 22) and SS 
curve (equation 23) to substitute for the terms LN-ag and LS –bgξλ/g, re-
spectively, in equation 24: 
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From this equation, and defining θ(hN,λ)={[λ–(1–α)hN]/(λ+r)}λ/r, 
we obtain 
Result 1  For given λ>r , if hS is sufficiently small relative to hN so that 
hS<hN θ, then wS /wN falls as LS increases. 
Proof  See Appendix B.
When LS increases, g and ξ both increase. As shown in Figure 3, ef-
fect I always shifts the relative supply curve RAp to the right. Effect II 
might shift RAp to the left or right, depending on the magnitude of ξλ/g  . 
If ξλ/g is sufficiently small (which is true when hS is small), effect II shifts   
RAp to the right. Effect III always shifts the relative demand curve RDp 
to the right, but its effect is small when ξ is small (which is true when 
hS  is  small).  Therefore,  when  hS  is  sufficiently  small  relative  to  hN, the 
combined effects of I and II dominate effect III, lowering the equilibrium   
wS /wN , as shown in Figure 3. 
The  intuition  for  this  result  is:  When  LS  is  sufficiently  small  given   
LN , the fraction of goods produced by the South, ξ, and the rate of innova-
tion, g, are both relatively small. In this case, an increase in LS leads to 
a higher percentage increase in the relative supply of labor for production 
(because of the small g) than the percentage increase in the relative demand 
of labor for production (because of the small ξ). Thus, relative wage wS /wN 
decreases.
Next,  we  find  the  sufficient  condition  for  wS /wN  to  increase  when 
LS  increases.  Once  again,  making  use  of  equation  25,  and  defining   
Γ(hN,λ)≡[hN+αr/(1–α)][λ/(λ+r)] [λ–(1–α)hN]/[(1–α)hN+r], we obtain 
Result 2  For given λ, if hS is sufficiently large relative to hN so that 
hS >Γ(hN, λ), then wS /wN rises as LS increases. 
Proof  See Appendix C.
Since ξλ/g (an indicator of the cost of imitation) increases with LS in 
equilibrium, when hS is large, ξλ/g is also large, so that effect II shifts RAp 
to the left. Moreover, effect III shifts RDp to the right, and its effect is suf-
ficiently strong when ξ is sufficiently large. As before, effect I shifts the  RAp 
curve to the right, but its effect is (partially) offset by effect II, as shown in 
Figure 4. In this case, the combined effects of II and III dominate that of 














































Figure 4: Effects of Increase in Southern Labor Allocation When LS Is 
Large
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NOTE: These are the effects of an increase in LS when hS >Γ.
The  intuition  for  this  result  is:  When  LS  is  sufficiently  large  given   
LN , the fraction of goods produced by the South, ξ , and the rate of innova-
tion, g, are both relatively large. In this case, an increase in LS leads to a 
lower percentage increase in the relative supply of labor for production (be-
cause of the large g) than the percentage increase in the relative demand of 
labor for production (because of the large ξ ). Thus, the relative wage wS /
wN increases.
Figure 5 summarizes Results 1 and 2. For a given value of hN, starting 
from a point where LS is small, an increase in LS gradually moves the world 
from a zone where ∂(wS/wN)/∂LS <0 to a zone where ∂(wS/wN)/∂LS >0. In 
other words, in the initial stage of the South’s integration with the North, 
when LS is small, increases in LS tend to lower the relative wage of the South. 
As LS increases further, a point will be reached such that increases in LS   
tend to raise the relative wage of the South. In the first zone (e.g., point 
A), in the initial stage of integration, an increase in LS leads to a larger 
fraction of goods being produced by the low-cost region. Therefore, the av-
erage price of goods is lower than before, everything else being equal. In 














































Figure 5: The Non-Monotonic Effect of LS on wS /wN
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switches sign from negative to positive.
Thus, their real wage must increase. Moreover, the rate of innovation is 
faster, making more goods available to consumers. All three factors con-
tribute to higher welfare for Northern workers. However, at the later stage 
of the South’s integration with the North, when LS is sufficiently large so 
that the world is in the second zone (e.g., point B), increases in LS lead to 
a higher relative wage for the South. By the same logic as before, it is clear 
that Southern workers are better off as integration deepens at this stage. 
The Northern relative wage is lower. However, the North can still gain from 
further integration, since the average price of goods is cheaper, and the rate 
of innovation is faster.
Figure 6 summarizes the non-monotonic effect of an increase in LS  o n   
wS /wN.
Figure 6: Effect of Deepening of Globalization on Relative Wage of South




















































Increase in Learning Capability of South
We can think of the increase in λ as an increase in the learning capa-
bility of the South in the sense that they learn to imitate faster, or that the 
learning curve is steeper.
Result 3  An increase in λ leads to increases in g, ξ, and wS /wN. 
Proof  From the results in Table 2, an increase in λ leads to increases in 
g and ξ but a decrease in ξλ/g. (See also footnote 10 for the derivation.) From 
equation 25, it follows that wS /wN increases unambiguously •
The intuition is: An increase in λ lowers ξλ/g, a component of the cost of 
imitation that depends on the time to imitate. Hence, Southern firms imitate 
more goods at each date, and ξ increases. Since an increase in ξ  encourages 
more firms in the North to innovate, g also increases, according to equa-
tion 22. Moreover, since λ/g also increases (according to footnote 10), we 
conclude from equation 25 that effect II is always dominated by effect III, 
leading to an increase in wS /wN . (There is no effect I.)
Therefore, an increase in the fraction of goods produced by the South 
through an improvement in the imitative capability of the South, rather 
than an increase in the allocation of labor, would unambiguously increase 
the relative wage of the South and thus improve the welfare of the Southern 
workers.
Let us summarize our main results. Analyzed from the perspective of 
product-cycle theory, globalization of production resulting from trade liber-
alization between the North and the South and imitation of Northern tech-
nology by the South would increase growth of the North. In the initial stage 
of globalization of production, deeper globalization unambiguously improves 
the welfare of skilled labor in the North, though welfare of Southern skilled 
labor may still increase. In the later stage of production globalization, deeper 
globalization of production unambiguously improves the welfare of skilled la-
bor in the South, though welfare of Northern skilled labor may still improve. 
This is caused by the fact that an increase in the allocation of Southern 
skilled labor that participates in the product cycle has a non-monotonic im-
pact on the wage of Southern skilled labor relative to that of the North.
4. CONCLUSION AND CAVEATS
Analyzed from the perspective of product-cycle theory, globalization of 
production resulting from trade liberalization between the North and the 
South and imitation of Northern technology by the South would increase 
the rate of innovation and growth of the North. However, an increase in the 
South’s participation in the product cycle can lead to a non-monotonic effect 
on the wage of Southern skilled labor relative to that of the North. In the 
initial stage of the South’s participation in the international product cycle, 
when the cost of telecommunications is relatively high, the South’s allocation 
of skilled labor is small. An increase in the allocation of Southern skilled 
labor to product-cycle goods caused by a decrease in the cost of telecom-
munications lowers the relative wage of the South. Eventually, however, as 














































large, the relative wage of the South increases as its skilled labor alloca-
tion increases. Thus, in the initial stage of the South’s participation in the 
product cycle, the North unambiguously gains from deeper globalization of 
production due to the increase in real wages as well as the faster rate of in-
novation. In the later stage of the South’s participation in the product cycle, 
the South unambiguously gains from deeper globalization of production for 
the same reason. However, it does not mean that the South necessarily loses 
in the initial stage or the North necessarily loses in the later stage. Both 
regions can gain from deeper globalization of production as a higher fraction 
of goods are produced in the low-cost South and as the rate of innovation 
increases so that a larger variety of goods are available at each date.
In any case, Southern skilled labor necessarily gains from deeper global-
ization of production by improving its imitation capability through learning 
to imitate faster, as this unambiguously increases the Southern relative wage 
as well as enhances the rate of innovation.
For further research, we can endogenize a firm’s decision to imitate or 
innovate a product, possibly assuming the capability to innovate depends 
positively on the experience in imitation. It will be interesting to see how our 
results change with these modifications.
APPENDIX A
Proof that NN is upward sloping
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1
, which is less than zero since 
ξ< 1. Therefore, h(ξ,g) increases as ξ decreases, for any given g. According-







(, ), we have ∂
∂ > f
ξ 0 for any given g, as long as 0 <ξ<1.
APPENDIX B
Proof of Result 1 
From  equation  22,  we  see  that  g  increases  as  ξ  increases  in  or-
der  to  maintain  Northern  market  equilibrium.  Therefore,  ξ = 0  and 
ξ→1  define  the  lower  and  upper  limit,  respectively,  of  the  value  that 
g can take in the steady state. It can be shown that the minimum g is 
found from setting ξ = 0 in equation 22 and solving for g : gmin=(1–α)
hN –αr. The maximum g is found from solving for g in equation 22 as   
ξ→1: gmax =(1–α)hN.
From Figure 2 and Table 2, an increase in LS raises both g and ξ. 








ξ 0 and (b) ∂
∂ < RHS
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.
The first of the above conditions implies the second one. Of course, hN 
has to be sufficiently small relative to λ to ensure λ>g, and a sufficient 









=(ξλ ⁄g)max: From equation 23, 
1−α
α (hS−gξλ ⁄g)=(g+ρ)ξλ ⁄g , which implies  



























N ξλ/g ξλ/g (ξλ/g)max= . Therefore,  
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Proof of Result 2 
Since an increase in LS raises both g and ξ, the sufficient conditions for 
wS
wN  to increase are (a) ∂
∂ > RHS
ξ 0 and (b) ∂
∂ > RHS
g 0 in equation 25. It turns out 
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       


      


       
.
It is obvious that the second condition above implies the first. From 
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